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Economic and
Social
Council |
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/3
7 June 2004
Original:
ENGLISH
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COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights
Fifty-sixth session
Item 1 of the provisional agenda
ORGANIZATION OF
WORK
Proposal for inclusion
of an item in the provisional
agenda
Note by the Secretary-General
1.
Pursuant to rules 5 (2) (h) and 5 (4) of the rules of
procedure of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social
Council,
non-governmental organizations in category I may propose
items for
the provisional agenda of the Sub-Commission provided that:
(a) An organization that
intends to propose
such an item shall inform the Secretary-General at least nine weeks
before the
commencement of the session, and before formally proposing an item
shall give
due consideration to any comments the secretariat may make;
(b) The proposal shall be
formally submitted
with basic documents not less than seven weeks before the commencement
of the
session.
2.
It is also stated (rule 5 (4) (ii)) that an item proposed in
accordance with the above provisions shall be included in the agenda of
the
Sub-Commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members
present
and voting.
3.
The phrase “members present and voting” means members casting
an affirmative or negative vote.
Members which abstain from voting are considered as not voting
(rule 58 (2)).
GE.04-14442 (E)
180604
4.
On 29 March 2004, the secretariat of the Sub-Commission
received a copy of the communication addressed to the Secretary-General
by the
Asian Legal Resource Centre, a non-governmental organization in general
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, informing the
Secretary-General of its intention to propose, under rule 5 (4) of the
rules of
procedure, an item for the provisional agenda of the fifty-sixth
session of the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights “to
conduct a
study regarding the exceptional collapse of rule of law in Sri Lanka
and thus
to make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights as per the
mandate of
the Sub-Commission”.
5.
On 14 May 2004, the secretariat of the Sub-Commission received
a letter from the Asian Legal Resource Centre, in furtherance to its
letter of
intent dated 29 March 2004, formally proposing the above-mentioned item
for the
provisional agenda of the Sub-Commission and transmitting a report to
be placed
before the Sub-Commission. The report
is reproduced in the annex to this document.* **
*
Reproduced as received, in the language of submission only.
**
The annexes to the report, consisting of 514 pages in total, are
available for consultation in the files of the Secretariat[mbk1].
Annex

REPORT
Report for the New
Agenda Item
Under Rule 5 (4) a (ii) of the Guidelines for the Application by the
Sub–Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of the
Rules of
Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social
Council and
other Decisions and Practices Relating thereto.
Asian
Legal Resource Centre
1.
Background
1. 1. The Asian Legal
Resource Centre, (hereinafter
referred to as the ALRC) a Regional Non-Governmental Organisation with
General
Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council with its
registered
office at 19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building, 998, Canton Road, Mong Kok,
Kowloon,
Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, China, wish to submit this
proposal
to the Honourable Secretary General through the Secretariat of the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in
furtherance
to its former letter of intent dated 29 March 2004 to propose an item
for the
provisional agenda under Rule 5 (4) a (i) of the Guidelines for the
Application
by the Sub – Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
of the
Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and
Social
Council and other Decisions and Practices Relating thereto to the Sub
Commission to conduct a study on the exceptional collapse of rule of
law in Sri
Lanka (hereinafter referred to as ‘State’) and thus to make
recommendations to
the Commission on Human Rights as per the mandate of the Sub-Commission.
1. 2. The purpose of the
proposed study is to aid the
State to recover the now collapsed public trust and confidence in the
institutions pertaining to the rule of law in Sri Lanka and thereby to
augment
the state’s effort to establish stable and sustainable peace. As rule
of law
practically must be understood in an institutional framework where
effective
and functioning administration of justice is the foundation, this is
the basis
of effective protection of human rights. The ALRC expects that the
proposal
would further substantiate the content and purpose of the letter of
intent
mentioned above.
2.
Scope of the study mentioned in the proposal
2. 1. The scope of the
proposal is within the ambit of
the UDHR and in furtherance with Article 2 of the ICCPR & the
ICESCR which
provides for international cooperation and assistance to provide
effective
remedy through competent judicial, administrative and legislative
process and
enforcement of such remedies thereby establishing the rule of law
within the
State. The failure of the State to provide for such remedies due to the
exceptional collapse of rule of law has interrupted the realization of
the
obligations of the State as a signatory to the international
conventions and to
all its citizens, including the minorities. The cases attached along
with this
proposal will prove the above statement. These are cases received from
various
reliable sources including local non-governmental organisations and
individuals
seeking urgent intervention. Many of these cases are reported by the UN
Special
Rapporteur in his report E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.1.
2. 2.
Rule of
law is also a precondition for
economic development. In Sri Lanka the high state of insecurity
resulting from
the break down of the institutions that should safeguard rule of law
has led to
increase in crime. A common concern has been expressed by all sections
in the
society including business sector, political leaders and civil society
about
the high level as well as the increasingly more cruel nature of the
crime that
is taking place in the State. Often, this is referred to as a societal
collapse. In this situation, labour dispute that in normal
circumstances could
be resolved by negotiations often end up in continuous strikes. Of
particular
concern is the suspension of work in the health sector - by the
doctors, nurses
and other hospital staff. Such situations affect the population,
particularly
the less affluent sections that are more vulnerable and depending on
the
functioning of such state provided services for their survival. The
present
situation affects economic, social and cultural rights badly. The way
poverty
alleviation programmes are affected by the absence of rule of law is a
matter
of particular concern. Donations received for poverty alleviation is
arbitrarily used, creating divisions among the poor and the system has
developed clusters of control, manipulation and violence.
The situation reported form 1977 continues even now and has even turned
worse.
2. 3. The issue of the
poorer sections of the country
losing the opportunity for better medical care remains a concern. The
quality
of the medical service to the general public in some decades back has
been
better than what it is now. Therefore, there is a lowering of the
standards
that were once assured.
2. 4. The available mechanisms for protection
of human rights and for prevention of torture in particular and for
further
redressal of grievances, are the courts and the national human rights
commission. However, the National Human Rights Commission is not
empowered or
geared by way of sufficient resources to provide adequate remedies for
violations of the rights of ordinary citizens due to soft legislation
and
incapacity for execution. In this context the statement issued by the
Asian
Human Rights Commission, a sister concern of ALRC explains what has
gone wrong
with the National Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka and what
remedial
measures should be immediately adopted to cure this problem. The letter
is as
follows:
A statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission
The inadequacies of the
torture prevention
policy adopted by the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
(The
Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has announced that it will launch
a
Torture Prevention and Monitoring Unit on 22 May 2004. On February 19
its
Chairperson issued a short policy paper on torture. In this statement
the Asian
Human Rights Commission, together with its partners in Sri Lanka,
examines this
policy and makes recommendations for the improvement of both the policy
and
practices of the Commission.)
We
welcome the inauguration of the Torture Prevention and Monitoring Unit
within
the Human Rights Commission (HRC) of Sri Lanka. However, we hasten to
add that
we hope this will not prove to be a mere gesture intended only to make
Sri
Lanka’s human rights record look good in the reports that the
government
submits to agencies abroad, including the UN agencies for human rights.
There
are many such ‘units’ referred to in various reports, but people living
in Sri
Lanka are often unaware of them, as they do nothing much to redress the
grave
violations of human rights taking place in the country.
Perhaps
one way to reflect fruitfully on the task of this new unit is to
examine why
the HRC has failed to develop even a moderately effective programme to
deal
with the endemic torture that is taking place in Sri Lanka. The
oft-repeated
answer is that the Commission does not have sufficient financial
resources. One
hopes that the new unit will not be offering the same excuse after some
time.
Whatever the validity of this explanation, it is also very clear that
the
Commission has lacked a clear policy regarding the elimination of
torture in
keeping with the UN Convention against Torture. Even now, going by an
official
HRC statement made on 19 April 2004, the Commission has not shown a
serious
understanding of how torture is deeply embedded in the country’s
criminal
justice system. The HRC’s statement was as follows:
“From
May 2004, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka will institute a
zero-tolerance policy on torture. The elements of the policy are:
“The
setting up of a 24 hour special unit for torture and emergency cases,
investigation on torture cases will begin within 24 hours of the
incident being
reported, whenever there is a death in custody with an adverse medical
report,
the OIC [Officer in Charge] of the police station will be summoned
before the
HRC, discussions with Police Commission to secure interdiction of
police
officers found guilty of torture by the Human Rights Commission or the
Supreme
Court.
“In
addition the HRC will work with the police to implement the Memorandum
of
understanding between the HRC and the IGP [Inspector General of
Police]. The
elements of that understanding were:
“Posters
with regard to the rights of suspects shall be displayed in all three
languages
in all police stations, training programmes on human rights at the
Police
Training Institute will be strengthened. Family members and lawyers
will be
able to visit anyone held in detention. Officers-in-Charge (OIC) of
stations to
be held directly accountable for cases of torture at the police
station. The
HRC, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and the Police Commission to
consider the possibility of indicting police officials who been held
guilty of
fundamental rights violations before the Supreme Court.”
It is
worthwhile to examine this brief statement to assess even whether it
can be
realized, and in so reduce, if not eliminate, the type of torture that
exists
in Sri Lanka. In doing so we will make reference to some specific
cases.
‘Zero-tolerance’: A
soft
expression hiding an inadequate policy
In
terms of the Convention against Torture (CAT) and corresponding CAT Act
(No. 22
of 1994) in Sri Lanka, ‘zero-tolerance’ is not in itself a policy
objective.
Under international law torture is regarding as one of the most heinous
of
crimes. Under the law of Sri Lanka, torture has been defined as a
serious
crime. When it comes to crimes such as murder, rape, etc., we do not
talk of
‘zero-tolerance’; we talk of them as crimes, and the perpetrators as
criminals.
To begin with anything less is to soften the fight against torture. The
clear
message that the perpetrators of torture should receive is that they
are
criminals and that they will be dealt with as such. What message does
‘zero-tolerance’ carry to torturers? Had the Commission said that it
would
consider it a priority to implement and to improve the CAT Act in Sri
Lanka and
punish the perpetrators, it would have carried a message to those who
engage in
this practice despite there being a law against it since 1994.
The
soft expression used by the HRC speaks to its past practices on
torture. Until
not very long ago HRC officers settled torture cases for small sums of
money,
if anything. In some cases the settlement was Rs 1000 (about US).
Torture
inquiries were reduced to arbitration. The idea that they were dealing
with a
serious crime under domestic law and a heinous crime under
international law
did not enter into the minds of these officers. They adopted a
scandalously
careless approach, to the great relief of the perpetrators. The present
zero-tolerance approach does not show a significant break from that
thinking.
What
does dealing with torture as a crime imply?
a. Criminal
investigations: A criminal
investigation takes place whenever there
are complaints of torture. Anything less betrays both the domestic and
international law on torture.
b. Criminal trials: It may be argued that
the HRC does not have the
mandate or resources to deal with torture as a crime. However, this
argument is
meaningless when it comes to how the HRC should approach the issue. If
it does
not have resources and power to take on torture as a crime (as required
by law)
it should be ready to work critically and seriously monitor other state
agencies that are required to deal with torture as a crime. According
to
government reports to UN agencies such as the UN Human Rights Committee
and the
Committee against Torture, the official function of making criminal
investigations into offences under the CAT Act is assigned to a Special
Investigation Unit (SIU). The SIU functions under the Prevention of
Torture
Perpetrators Unit (PTPU) out of the Department of the Attorney General.
The
government claims that this Unit has filed about forty cases in High
Courts,
though so far there has not been a single successful prosecution.
Whatever the
defects are—and many are visible—torture has not yet once been dealt
with as a
crime in Sri Lanka.
c. Studying existing
procedures: The starting point
for any serious discussion on
the elimination of torture in Sri Lanka should be to study the existing
procedures for investigation and prosecution and their limitations, and
thereafter to develop an effective strategy to overcome them. Such a
study and
a counter-strategy could lead to improvements.
d. Improving existing
procedures: How could the HRC
contribute to the improvement of
criminal investigations and the prosecution procedure as existing now?
i.
Treat all investigations into allegations of torture as possible cases
for
prosecution. This would imply that torture complaints would be
investigated
with a view to gather all the evidence with which to prove an offence
of
torture in a criminal case, which at an appropriate stage would be
shared with
the Department of the Attorney General, to pursue prosecutions.
ii.
Critically monitor the PTPU investigations and prosecutions and make
official
representations where reason exists to be dissatisfied.
iii.
Engage civil society on torture and the ways by which legal redress can
be
obtained for acts of torture, through education and other means.
iv.
Engage the National Police Commission (NPC) and the Police Department
and
instruct police officers that torture is a crime for which they will be
punished, thereby establishing a different set of principles in dealing
with
torture.
‘A 24-hour special unit
for
torture and emergency cases’: Nothing new
Such
a unit has been in existence for several years. In spite of many
defects, it
has done a useful service by receiving calls, talking to—and sometimes
visiting—police stations. This is a good practice coming from the time
of the
earlier Task Force. However, this work needs considerable improvement
if it is
to prove capable of dealing with reports coming from various parts of
the
country and to deal with them effectively.
In
the case of Mr. K.P. Tissa Kumara, for instance, a young artisan who
was
severely beaten by an officer of the Wellipena Police before a TB
patient was
made to spit into his mouth, a prompt complaint was made to the HRC.
The
incident took place on February 3, but there has been no real help
offered to
this person by the HRC. On April 30 doctors suspected that he had
caught the
disease. All this time he was in the remand prison with serious bodily
injuries
and unable to take any precautions to prevent the spread of TB in his
body.
This
is one of many cases where the HRC’s unit for dealing with complaints
could
have made a difference, but to do so it needs guidelines, and proper
supervision. Has the HRC made any such guidelines and arrangements for
supervision of this new unit? If not, its use will be very limited, and
many
will continue to suffer like Mr. Tissa Kumara.
‘Investigation on
torture cases
will begin within 24 hours of the incident being reported’: What does
it mean?
This
is a welcome change from the present position, where often even months
after a
report no investigation really takes place. However, what the
‘beginning’ of
investigation means has not been made clear. To make it clear it is
necessary
to have an investigation procedure.
The need for an
investigation procedure: One of the criticisms
of the HRC from its very
inception has been the lack of an investigation procedure. Despite its
administration changing hands, there has been no attempt at all to lay
down
such a procedure, which may explain the cheap settlements easily
arrived at in
the past. If the beginning of an investigation is to be a meaningful
exercise
the HRC must lay down a procedure for its investigations and make it
known to
the investigators and the public. That way, the investigators will know
what to
do and the public will know what to expect.
Though
it is said that the investigation will begin in 24 hours, nothing has
been said
about when it will end. There are so many cases where complaints have
been made
to the HRC and the complainants even up to now do not know what has
happened to
their cases. The case of Chamila Bandara, the 17-year-old boy severely
beaten
by the Ankumbura Police, is one instance. The complaint was made in
July 2003.
However, up to the present day the inquiries are continuing. In some
cases
where victims have allegedly been kept in remand custody on fabricated
charges
after torture, the inquiries have gone on for up to a year while these
people
remain in prison.
Will
it be different now that inquiries are to begin in 24 hours? There is
no reason
to think so, unless a clear investigation procedure is laid down and
the
complainants are made aware of how proceedings are going. The harsh
distancing
of the complainants from the investigating systems, and making
everything
appear as if they have no right to know anything about the
investigation will
only ensure that things will remain as they are.
Dealing with rogue
investigators and
corrupt Area Coordinators:
Further questions can be raised regarding investigations conducted from
Area
Offices. Who will conduct these inquiries? Will it be the same people
as
before, i.e., the Area Coordinators? How about the Area Coordinators
who are
known to be collaborators with the perpetrators of torture, such as the
Area
Coordinator of Kandy, whose betrayal of victims of human rights
violations and
whose partiality to the perpetrators is well known? Many parties have
placed complaints
regarding this Coordinator with the HRC for a long time now without any
results. If such ‘investigators’ continue, what will be the effect of
beginning
inquiries within 24 hours? Would it mean that as soon as complaints are
made
perpetrators will be alerted so that they can do all they need to
subvert the
inquiries and to harass the complainants?
The need for witness
protection: Everyone knows that the
most difficult obstacle in
eliminating torture is that the complainants fear the consequences
after making
complaints against security personnel. The fear is well founded, as the
poor in
particular have been subjected to harsh punishments after making
complaints.
Most frequently they have been implicated in crimes which they did not
commit.
For example, after Lalith Rajapakse made a complaint about brutal
injuries
caused to him by the Kandana Police, he was charged with two counts of
robbery.
Having attended court for almost two years he was acquitted from the
charges,
as there was no evidence at all against him—not even an adverse witness
statement. Angelina Roshana, a girl brutally tortured by the
Narahenpita
Police, was also falsely charged with stealing a gold watch worth about
Rs
500,000, but later acquitted because there was no evidence at all
against her.
Chamila Bandara, mentioned above, has been falsely charged with several
counts
of theft, without the slightest evidence. Tissa Kumara, also mentioned
above,
is still in remand falsely accused of possessing a bomb. A long list of
similar
cases can be cited.
There
are other measures used to intimidate persons who make complaints.
Chamila
Bandara’s family was exposed to so much harassment that they had to
leave their
home. They did so in late July 2003 and to the present day have been
unable to
return. They lodged a complaint with the HRC, but no attempt was made
to
provide protection for their return. Michael Anthony (Tony) Fernando,
who has
complained of being tortured when he was in remand custody, later
escaped a
kidnapping attempt and has been in hiding for several months now.
Any
serious attempt to deal with torture must be accompanied by a programme
of
witness protection. The United Nations Human Rights Committee made
recommendations to the government of Sri Lanka to this effect on 2
November
2003.
‘Whenever there is a
death in
custody with an adverse medical report, the OIC of the police station
will be
summoned before the HRC’: A highly flawed proposal
Why the qualification? The qualification for
HRC intervention in custodial
deaths only ‘with an adverse medical report’ is surprising. A major
cover-up in
custodial deaths takes place well before medical reports are made. For
example,
when a person is said to have hanged himself inside a police cell, the
scene is
easily pre-arranged and doctors called merely to certify the police
version of
what happened. The victims’ families need help before that stage, but
lawyers
are not usually allowed in while investigations are taking place inside
police
stations.
In
the case of Garlin Kankanamge Sanjeewa, whose body was found hanging in
a
police cell at the Kadawatha Police Station, his mother alleged that
she was
called to the station under the pretext that her son was in police
custody.
Only several hours after arriving at the station was she brought to the
place
where her son was hanging, and merely to identify his dead body. The
doctor was
already present. She had no assistance to protest the manner in which
the
investigation was conducted. Later she buried her son’s body in a
relative’s
compound with a view to getting a second post mortem. It is really at
the
earliest stage of death in custody taking place that the HRC must make
its
intervention, otherwise in many cases it will be too late.
Why summon the OIC? It is very difficult
to understand what objective
would be served by summoning an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of a police
station
after a death in police custody. The HRC has not explained what it
would do
after summoning the OIC. Earlier it had made an announcement that
whenever
torture takes place at a police station the OIC would be held
responsible.
However, it never explained exactly what action would be taken against
such an
OIC. Since that announcement literally hundreds of torture complaints
have been
made but not one OIC has ever been summoned to the HRC. The public has
a right
to know how an OIC will be held to account, and what consequences are
envisaged. Making empty threats only makes a bad situation even more
ridiculous.
OICs are criminally
liable: Under domestic and
international law, an OIC can
be held liable as a person aiding and abetting an offence. As the chief
investigator of all crimes taking place within a police station, he is
estopped
from denying knowledge about what took place during a criminal
investigation
under his jurisdiction. He can also be held for conspiring in the
offence of
torture taking place within his station. Therefore the HRC must examine
the
criminal liability of an OIC for any act of torture taking place within
his
station and recommend what should happen to such officers under the CAT
Act.
The
liability of an OIC also arises from the principle of command
responsibility,
under which an OIC can be held responsible for a violation of
fundamental
rights. The HRC has a right to conduct inquiries on violations of
fundamental
rights and there is no reason to exempt an OIC from liability for
fundamental
rights violations taking place within his police station.
ASPs are also
responsible: There is no reason for
command responsibility to
stop with the OIC. In fact every Assistant Superintendent of Police
(ASP) has
direct responsibility for supervising the police stations in his area.
In terms
of disciplinary control, his liability matters even more than that of
the OIC.
In the past there had been some instances when ASPs were summoned by
the HRC.
When the ASP Kodithuwacku was summoned he challenged the authority of
the
inquiring officer. How the matter was resolved remains a mystery to the
public.
In dealing with torture it is essential that the command responsibility
of the
ASP be addressed. In fact the Supreme Court has held, in the case of
Gerald
Perera, among others, that the responsibility continues on up to the
Inspector
General of Police. The HRC should at least begin by upholding the legal
developments that have taken place in the country so far. To set
standards far
less than these will undermine the human rights struggle to eliminate
torture.
In fact, the HRC is duty bound to uphold the norms and standards of the
United
Nations regarding torture.
Doctors are also
liable: One of the major
impediments to torture victims
seeking redress are the inaccurate and even sometimes false medical
reports
filed by some District Medical Officers and Judicial Medical Officers.
Often
local relationships and other obligations cause medical officers to
issue
misleading medical reports. The HRC should discuss with the Medical
Council
about ways to prevent this practice. Where the HRC has evidence of
false
reports being issued, the doctors should be summoned to the HRC and
also officially
reported to the Medical Council.
‘Discussions with
Police
Commission to secure interdiction of police officers found guilty of
torture by
the Human Rights Commission or the Supreme Court’: The Establishment
Code
versus the Constitution
The
position so far held by the Police Department is that as judgments of
the
Supreme Court on fundamental rights applications do not amount to
criminal
convictions these should not affect the promotions of the officers
concerned.
The argument is based on the Establishment Code, which stipulates
disciplinary
consequences for state officers who are convicted in criminal offences.
The
implication is that the fundamental rights enshrined in the
Constitution do not
matter. The HRC must challenge and defeat this position. Mere
discussions with
the National Police Commission (NPC) are not likely to yield any
significant
result until the Police Department and NPC admit their duty to uphold
the
Constitution and police liability when provisions of the Constitution
are
violated.
We
will now turn to examine some areas of concern not yet addressed by the
HRC.
Trauma and
Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder
Torture
has a terrible effect on the mind and emotions. As a result, literally
tens of
thousands of people across the country are suffering from trauma and
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. One does not have to go very far to
discover
persons suffering acutely. All that one needs to do is to interview a
few
torture victims and the stark reality of extremely deep psychological
problems
will soon surface. But what services are available to deal with such
problems?
In fact, they are extremely limited and very inadequate. Some good
doctors have
tried to be of some help, however, their work has meant little overall
in an
ocean of deep distress and trouble.
The
Sri Lankan government is obliged under international laws to which it
is a
party to provide facilities for persons suffering from the
psychological
effects of torture. However, it has not at any stage created a facility
for the
treatment of torture victims, nor allocated any funds for this purpose.
It has
no plan at all to address this issue.
The
HRC likewise has to date done no work in this area, and nor does its
recent
policy statement make any reference to the psychological consequences
of
torture. This is a very serious lapse of policy that needs to be
corrected as
soon as possible. Its first obligation is take up the matter with the
government and persuade it to comply with international law. This could
be done
by way of recommendations and lobbying. The HRC can also help the
government to
draw up specific plans. By engaging the public on this issue the HRC
can also
educate people to exercise influence over the government to establish
such
facilities.
While
persuading the government to honour its obligations the HRC can also
try to
influence the community to assist torture victims. Strong appeals by
the HRC
would likely find responses from psychiatrists, doctors, counsellors
and other
concerned persons. Victims coming forward to make complaints about
torture
could then be directed to such persons, and organisations dealing with
trauma
and psychological problems. In fact, the HRC should have a unit to deal
with
this issue alone, or in the interim at least a volunteer group under
its
supervision. As for finances, it is quite likely that there would be
both local
and international donors to help if such a unit were established.
Institutional liability
for
torture
The
HRC has approached torture purely from the point of view of individual
liability. However, torture is primarily an institutional problem. The
endemic
torture as found in Sri Lanka is a result of a tacitly accepted policy
that
torture is necessary and unavoidable. Successive commissions appointed
to
inquire into the police—Justice Soertsez’s Commission of 1947, Justice
Basnayake’s Commission of 1970, Subasinghe’s Salaries Commission of
1978, and
Jayasinghe’s Commission of 1995—all pointed to institutional problems.
Later
commissions inquiring into forced disappearances also laid bare the
grim
reality that torture is entrenched in policing in Sri Lanka.
In
fact, there is no controversy on this point. The 17th Amendment to the
Constitution was itself based on the need to address the problems of
some
public institutions, including the police, which have collapsed due to
developments in recent times. Some researchers who have held high
positions in
the Police Department itself have revealed the inherent limitations of
the
system as it exists today. In a letter dated 6 May 2004 to the Attorney
General, written on behalf of the Asian Human Rights Commission, Basil
Fernando
pointed to this:
“It
would be quite naïve on our part to think that the police in Sri
Lanka would
want suggestions from any of us if they really want to stop torture
taking
place at police stations or elsewhere during criminal investigations.
They
would already know HOW to do this, if they really WANTED to do this.
The real
problem is that there is a firm belief that torture is necessary and
unavoidable. The ratification of the CAT Convention against Torture and
even
making it into a law through the CAT Act (Act No.22/1994) was done
without the
proper engagement of the police in the exercise. The result was that
the police
were not confronted with the need to abandon a well-entrenched practice
in
their institution. Thus the police themselves did not have a part in
making one
of the most fundamental reforms that was required by the CAT and CAT
Act. Even
after the making of such a law and the undertaking of such serious
international obligations the police were not constructively engaged in
looking
into the new law and exposed to the obligations and implications it
entailed.
The result was that almost always in private conversations, the police
officers, including those of high rank, spoke and continue to speak of
the
practical impossibility of doing away with torture. Until this problem
is
internally resolved by way of genuine and open engagement within the
police
force itself no amount of external compulsion will be able to bring
about the
required mindset and the institutional conviction to honour the
obligations
under the CAT and to implement the CAT Act. In this regard your
position as the
country’s highest legal officer would be useful in engaging the police,
particularly
the higher-ranking officers, into a serious internal dialogue of the
thinking,
history and philosophy behind the CAT. I do not mean human rights
education for
these officers, I believe they are broadly aware of the arguments in
favour of
the CAT Act. In fact what I mean is a more practical institutional
dialogue
within which they could openly discuss the views that they hold. If in
such a
dialogue they agree to eliminate torture, I feel sure they will tell us
HOW.”
Without
a clear change in policy arrived at by way of a decision within the
Police
Department itself there is no possibility of eliminating torture. So
long as
the police tolerate, encourage and think of torture as necessary and
unavoidable the HRC’s ‘zero-tolerance’ will be of little consequence.
The educational role of
the HRC
towards eliminating torture
A
strong educational component is missing from the HRC’s policy on
torture, as it
has been since the beginning of its work. This is interesting, as some
other
national human rights commissions, even where they have failed in other
areas
of their mandate, have tried to fulfill their educational function.
Strong
educational work via electronic media and other means would do much to
eliminate torture. Widespread education on the CAT Act would benefit
civilians
as well as security officers. Education on legal remedies and how to
obtain
them would be useful to everyone. Public education would create the
pressure
needed for policy changes. The HRC can have free access to public media
channels.
Even private media channels are likely to respond to a call to support
this
mission. Creative persons in the human rights field, legal field and in
the
media can collaborate and achieve results within a short time.
Recommendations
To
develop a serious strategy towards the elimination of torture we urge
the HRC
to
a.
Make a clear policy statement on the elimination of torture based on
Sri
Lanka’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political
Rights (ICCPR) and CAT, as well as the CAT Act of Sri Lanka. Such a
paper will
help the public to understand and cooperate with the HRC on this matter.
b.
Concentrate on implementing the CAT Act while at the same time trying
to
improve it in line with the CAT. Develop strategies and methodologies
to
cooperate critically and monitor criminal investigations and
prosecutions
currently taking place under the ad hoc arrangements of the Prosecution
of
Torture Perpetrators Unit. Critical cooperation means studying how
investigations and prosecutions are done now and taking suitable action
to
ensure improvements. The HRC can also monitor investigations and
prosecutions
to ensure EFFECTIVE REMEDIES in terms of article 2 of the ICCPR.
c.
Develop and adopt a complaint receipt and investigation procedure
without
delay, to serve as the basis on which all investigations are conducted
and
reported. This implies abandoning earlier procedures for dealing with
torture
cases, such as the reaching of settlements. The procedure should be
made
available to the public so that people will be aware of what actions
will be
taken when they make complaints.
d.
Set a time within which to complete inquiries, and require that
complainants be
kept informed about the progress of their complaints.
e.
Inform the Department of the Attorney General where prima facie
evidence of
torture is uncovered, and ensure that proper criminal investigations
and
prosecutions follow.
f.
Establish and enforce a disciplinary procedure over inquiring officers
who
deliberately sabotage the process and side with the perpetrators. Take
other
measures to prevent negligence by investigating officers. Take prompt
action to
investigate and make appropriate decisions, particularly where
corruption is
alleged.
g.
Enforce command responsibility for torture, from OICs of police
stations to
ASPs and all others up to the IGP.
h.
Give special priority to trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
among
torture victims. Take appropriate action for the government to
recognize and
respect its responsibilities in this regard. Establish a unit within
the HRC,
even with volunteers, to provide services to such victims. Refer all
torture
victims who make complaints of torture to the HRC to qualified
professionals
for medical and psychological examination and treatment.
i.
Treat torture as an institutional problem arising from the nature of
the police
force as it exists now. Make suitable studies and generate public
discussion
and debate on the ways to overcome the institutional limitations
legitimating
torture. Engage the NPC, Police Department, and other responsible
agencies—such
as the Department of the Attorney General—in a policy discourse for
institutional reform. Provide the necessary technical assistance to the
NPC and
Police Department to evaluate and adopt practices that eliminate
torture. In
this regard, engage the government as well as the civil society for
quick
implementation of the Public Complaints Procedure envisaged by Article
155G(2)
of the amended Constitution, which requires that the NPC establish such
a
procedure.
j.
Undertake nationwide education on the CAT and CAT Act of Sri Lanka, and
the
ways to implement legal obligations arising from these.
Asian Human
rights Commission
2. 5.
The
courts, prosecution and other
mechanisms have completely failed and justice is tainted taking away
the
literal meaning of the term. As mentioned earlier, even the Apex court
ignores
torture thereby recognizing torture and augmenting the culture of
impunity.
Newer commissions such as the National Police Commission, despite its
one year
of existence, has also not taken any effective steps towards redressing
this
situation, even though constitutionally empowered to set up a public
complaints
procedure against police officers who commit violations of human rights.
3. Country situation
vis-à-vis
ratifications
3. 1. In terms with the
obligations of ratification of
the international conventions mentioned above and the spirit of UDHR,
the State
has enacted domestic legislation to prevent torture. However, ALRC
believes
that the implementation of these domestic laws have miserably failed
due to the
exceptional collapse of rule of law. This has paved way for total
impunity and
lack of adequate prosecution in cases of human rights violations in the
State,
especially in cases of disappearances, custodial deaths, summary
executions and
torture. Apart from the legal anomalies contrary to the State’s
international
human rights obligations and thus in violation of the stipulations of
the UDHR,
the situation in the State, as far as the actual working of its
domestic
mechanisms to give effect to those international obligations are
concerned, is
completely negative.
3. 2. There
are
umpteen observations and recommendations by various international
bodies
regarding the necessity for immediate action by the State in this regard. The UN
bodies like the Human Rights Committee, CAT Committee,
CEDAW Committee, CERD Committee, ESCR Committee, Committee on Rights of
Child,
reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Working Group on
Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances, reports of the Special Rapporteurs on
Extra
Judicial and Summary Execution, on Independence of Judges & Lawyers
and on
Torture, have several times requested and recommended the State to make
internal arrangements so as to address the issue of rule of law in the
State.
The treaty bodies and the extra-conventional mechanisms named above
also had
occasion to deal with numerous individual complaints from the State
indicating
an exceptional collapse of rule of law.
3. 3. Apart from these UN
bodies, report of the
International Bar Association (IBA), various reports and statements by
the
ALRC, Amnesty International, World
Organisation
Against Torture (OMCT) and other international, regional and national
non-governmental organisations have emphatically notified the State as
well as
the UN bodies about the total collapse of rule of law in the State. The
ALRC,
Amnesty International and the OMCT have on various occasions called
upon the
international community and the State to address the exceptional
collapse of
rule of law in the State with reference to specific cases.
3. 4. In spite of
recommendations and appeals the
situation of rule of law in the State has not only failed to yield any
change
but seems to have nose-dived into absolute failure. Currently, there
seem to be
no internal arrangement capable of moving out of the worsening
situation.
4. Observations by UN
bodies – The Human
Rights Committee.
4. 1. As
mentioned earlier the Human Rights Committee has aired its concern
through
remarks and recommendations to the state on several occasions.
In its concluding remarks dated 01-12-2003, the Committee expressed
concern
about:
4. 2. “[P]ersistent
reports of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment of
detainees by law enforcement officials and members of the armed forces,
and
that the restrictive definition of torture in the 1994 Convention
against
Torture Act continues to raise problems in the light of article 7 of
the
Covenant. It regrets that the majority
of prosecutions initiated against police officers or members of the
armed
forces on charges of abduction and unlawful confinement, as well as on
charges
of torture, have been inconclusive due to lack of satisfactory evidence
and
unavailability of witnesses, despite a number of acknowledged instances
of
abduction and/or unlawful confinement and/or torture, and only very few
police
or army officers have been found guilty and punished”.
4. 3. “The Committee also
notes with concern reports that
victims of human rights violations feel intimidated from bringing
complaints or
have been subjected to intimidation and/or threats, thereby
discouraging them
from pursuing appropriate avenues to obtain an effective remedy”.
4. 4. “[The state] should
ensure in particular that
allegations of crimes committed by State security forces, especially
allegations of torture, abduction and illegal confinement, are
investigated
promptly and effectively with a view to prosecuting perpetrators. The
National
Police Commission complaints procedure should be implemented as soon as
possible. The authorities should diligently enquire into all cases of
suspected
intimidation of witnesses and establish a witness protection program in
order
to put an end to the climate of fear that plagues the investigation and
prosecution of such cases”
4. 5. “The Committee is
concerned about the large number
of enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons during the time of
the
armed conflict, and particularly about the State party's inability to
identify,
or inaction in identifying those responsible and to bring them to
justice. This
situation, taken together with the reluctance of victims to file or
pursue
complaints (see para. 9 above), creates an environment that is
conducive to a
culture of impunity”.
4. 6. “The State party is
urged to implement fully the
right to life and physical integrity of all persons (Arts. 6, 7, 9 and
10, in
particular) and give effect to the relevant recommendations made by the
United
Nations Commission on Human Rights' Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary
Disappearances and by the Presidential Commissions for Investigation
into
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The National Human Rights
Commission
should be allocated sufficient resources to monitor the investigation
and
prosecution of all cases of disappearances”.
4. 7. “The Committee notes
with concern that overcrowding
remains a serious problem in many penitentiary institutions, with the
inevitable adverse impact on conditions of detention in these
facilities”.
4. 8. “The State party should
strengthen the independence
of the judiciary by providing for judicial, rather than parliamentary,
supervision and discipline of judicial conduct”.
4. 9. “The Committee is
concerned about persistent
reports that media personnel and journalists face harassment, and that
the
majority of allegations of violations of freedom of expression have
been
ignored or rejected by the competent authorities. The Committee
observes that
the police and other government agencies frequently do not appear to
take the
required measures of protection to combat such practices”.
4. 10. “The fifth periodic
report should be prepared in
accordance with the Committee's reporting guidelines
(CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.1) and
be submitted by 1 November 2007. The State party should pay particular
attention to indicating the measures taken to give effect to these
concluding
observations. The Committee requests that the text of the State party's
fourth
periodic report and the present concluding observations be published
and widely
disseminated throughout the country”.
4. 11. ”In accordance with
rule 70, paragraph 5, of the
Committee's rules of procedure, the State party should provide
information,
within one year, on its response to the Committee's recommendations
contained
in paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 18. The Committee requests the State party
to
provide information in its next report on the other recommendations
made and on
the implementation of the Covenant as a whole”.
4. 12. No
action whatsoever has been initiated neither is it likely to be
initiated
regarding the above recommendations made by the Human Rights Committee
in the
state.
4. 13. This
observation was not an isolated incident taking into account of any
recent
developments. The Human Rights Committee while considering the third
periodic
report of Sri Lanka on 27-07-1995 also emphatically requested the state
to:
4. 14. “The Committee notes
with particular concern that
an effective system for the prevention and punishment of such
violations does
not appear to exist. In addition, concern is expressed that violations
and
abuses allegedly committed by police officers have not been
investigated by an
independent body, and that frequently the perpetrators of such
violations have
not been punished. The Committee notes that this may contribute to an
atmosphere of impunity among the perpetrators of human rights
violations and
constitute an impediment to the efforts being undertaken to promote
respect for
human rights”.
4. 15. “The Committee is
concerned that the rights under
article 10 of the Covenant of persons deprived of their liberty in
prisons and
other places of detention are not fully respected. It regrets that
conditions
in places of detention other than prisons are not regulated by law and
that
prisons and other places of detention are not regularly visited by
magistrates
or other independent bodies”.
4. 16. “It also urges the
State party to take into account
that investigation and prosecution of criminal offences should be
carried out
by an independent body and that punishment of criminal offences should
be
carried out by the judiciary”.
4. 17. “[T]he Committee
recommends that as a matter of
priority all legal provisions or executive orders be reviewed to ensure
their
compatibility with the provisions of the Covenant and their effective
implementation in practice”.
4. 18. The above
recommendations by and large remained
recommendations. The failure in implementation was due to the
exceptionally
collapsed rule of law in the state. One significant factor in this
regard was
that not a single conviction had taken place for the past nine years
since Sri
Lanka’s CAT Act of 1994 was enacted, ostensibly to give effect to the
UN
Convention Against Torture. Thus the
culture of absolute impunity, horrendous torture, non-dependability of
the
system in toto, continues.
5. The CAT Committee.
5. 1. Similarly
the Committee against Torture vide its report on the 20th
session in
1998 expressed serious concern on the issue of torture and
disappearances
reported from Sri Lanka due to the exceptional failure of rule of law.
The Committee specifically points out that:
5. 2. “The serious internal
situation faced by the State
party, which however in no way justifies any violation of the
Convention”.
5. 3. “The
fact that for years in the past police officers appeared to be immune
from
prosecution”.
5. 4. “The
Committee is gravely concerned by information on serious violations of
the
Convention, particularly regarding torture linked with disappearances”.
5. 5. “The
Committee noted that, while the Convention against Torture Act 22/94
covers
most of the provisions of the Convention, there were certain
significant
omissions”.
5. 6. “The
Committee urges the State party to review Convention against Torture
Act 22/94
and other relevant laws in order to ensure complete compliance with the
Convention, in particular in respect of: (a) the definition of torture;
(b)
acts that amount to torture; and (c) extradition, return and expulsion”.
5. 7. “Ensure
that all allegations of torture – past, present and future – are
promptly,
independently and effectively investigated and the recommendations
implemented
without any delay”.
5. 8. “While
continuing to remedy, through compensation, the consequences of
torture, give
due importance to prompt criminal prosecutions and disciplinary
proceedings
against culprits”.
5. 9. “Take
the necessary measures to ensure that justice is not delayed,
especially in the
cases of trials of people accused of torture. Strengthen the Human
Rights
Commission and other mechanisms dealing with torture prevention and
investigation and provide them with all the means that are necessary to
ensure
their impartiality and effectiveness”.
5. 10. As
quoted above internal strife is no excuse for the state to derogate
from its
obligations. The deep silence due to sheer fear from further
persecution has
engulfed the community, the poor and marginalized in particular. The
internal
mechanisms are no more able to implement the recommendations without
international assistance. The stalemated situation of the peace process
if to
be improved should start with establishment of rule of law in the
state. This
requires specific study by independent bodies, especially by the UN or
its
ancillary bodies immediately.
6. The CEDAW Committee.
6. 1. The
CEDAW Committee in its Concluding Observations dated 07-05-2002
observed that:
6. 2. “The Committee is
alarmed by the high and severe
incidences of rape and other forms of violence targeted against Tamil
women by
the police and security forces in the conflict areas”.
6. 3. “The Committee urges
the State party to monitor
strictly the behaviour of the police and the security forces, to ensure
that
all perpetrators are brought to justice and to take all necessary
measures to
prevent acts of violence against all women”.
6. 4. The assault on women,
in particular the rural women
and those belonging to the minority community are left unchallenged and
the
perpetrators enjoy absolute impunity. The proposal will prove that the
atrocities committed against the women in the state are not limited to
the
minorities, but also extends to any other citizen. The proposal will
enumerate
the extent of horrendous violence committed against women and the
reason why
such violence is left unchallenged.
6. 5. Violence against women
is a common tool for
intimidation and threat. The widespread violence against women is a
pertinent
feature of any state that suffers from exceptionally filed rule of law.
History
is not short of examples to prove this. The Japanese practices during
World War
1, the mass rape in Rwanda and Burundi, the cases from former
Yugoslavia are to
name a few. If the situation in Sri Lanka is allowed to continue at the
current
state, the same will happen in Sri Lanka in a worse proportion. The
exceptionally
collapsed rule of law in the state is a fertile ground for such history
to
repeat in alarming proportions in very recent future.
7. Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.
7. 1. The
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has reported
regarding
the situation in Sri Lanka through its various reports. The report
E/CN.4/1995/36 dated 21 December 1994
comments upon the situation in Sri
Lanka in pages 354-369. The Working Group observed that between the
period 1980
to 1994 there are 11,441 cases of disappearances reported to the
Working Group.
7. 2. Similarly
the then Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances vide
its
report E/CN.4/1992/18/Add.1 had opined that the situation in Sri Lanka
regarding torture, disappearances and racial discrimination must be a
matter of
immediate concern. Referring to this report the CERD Committee in the
year 1995
requested the state to facilitate demonstrable results to the concern
of the
Working Group through effective domestic law enforcement mechanisms.
7. 3. However,
the subsequent observations by the CERD Committee in the year 2001 on
its 59th
session expressing concern of allegations of human rights violations in
the
country involving racial discrimination and bringing to justice the
responsible
persons shows that the situation remains the same without any
considerable
change and is thus an indicator to the failure of rule of law in the
country.
7. 4.
The
Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances in its report dated 21st Januray
2003
further recommended the Government to:
“The
Group wishes to remind the Government of its obligations under article
10 of
the Declaration to hold persons deprived of liberty only in officially
recognized places of detention, to bring them promptly before a
judicial
authority and to make available promptly accurate information on the
detention
of such persons to their family members, their legal counsel, or to any
other
persons having a particular interest”.
8. Special Rapporteur on Independence of
Judges & Lawyers
8. 1. In
the report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers
the Rapporteur observed referring to the report of the International
Commission
of Jurists that:
8. 2. “[T]he
perception of a lack of independence of the judiciary was in danger of
becoming
widespread and that it was extremely harmful to respect for the rule of
law by
ordinary citizens”.
8. 3.
This
observation is further
fortified from the fact that innumerable judgments of the Supreme Court
in
finding state officers responsible for violations of human rights have
directed
that their departmental heads, including the Inspector General of
Police, the
Army Commander etc. should take disciplinary action against those
officers
responsible, have been ignored. Police officers in charge of stations,
who have
been held responsible for heinous rights violations, continue to remain
at
their posts.
8. 4.
This
trend has taken a new turn with the
Court itself, in recent times, making statements that has detracted
from its
own authority. Thus, for example, in a recent verdict of the Supreme
Court of
Sri Lanka, the court among other issues answered the issue regarding
torture
and the resultant inquiry against law enforcement officers while
considering
their claim for promotion.
While deciding the case the court opined that even though the
respondents were
subjected for departmental inquiry against fundamental rights violation
and
torture and thus punished, this would not in any way, be held as a
disqualification for promotion.
9.
Special
Rapporteur on Torture
9. 1. The
Rapporteur on Torture in his report
E/CN.4/1994/31 dated 6 January 1994 narrates the practices followed by
the law
enforcement mechanism within the state.
The report narrates:
9. 2. “It was also reported
that in the north-east torture and
ill-treatment of prisoners continued in military, Special Task Force
and police
custody. Methods of torture include severe beatings; electric shocks;
burning
with cigarettes or matches; pouring petrol into prisoners’ nostrils and
then
placing a plastic bag over their heads; suspending prisoners from their
thumbs
and beating them; beating with barbed wire and repeatedly submerging
prisoners’
heads in water while they were suspended from their ankles. Women have
reported
being raped by soldiers. Torture was also reported to occur in both
police and
military custody in the south with respect to political detainees
arrested
under the Emergency Regulations and the PTA, as well as criminal
suspects. It
was further reported that, in the majority of cases, victims of torture
do not
file complaints or report their cases to governmental or
non-governmental
bodies for fear of reprisals”.
9. 3. The
Rapporteur in his subsequent report in the year 1999 shares the same
concern of
the CAT Committee that the situation of internal strife is no excuse
for
practice of torture or any violation of human rights.
The Rapporteur also shares the concern of the Committee regarding
numerous
instances of torture and disappearances reported from the state. The
report
narrates 40 cases of horrendous torture practiced by the law
enforcement
agencies in the state.
9. 4. In
the report for the year 2000 the Rapporteur reported that:
“It
remains evident that more prosecutions and convictions will be required
in
order significantly to affect the problem of impunity.
In any event, personnel responsible for
injury leading to compensation should be removed from office”.
9. 5. Further
in the year 2003 the Rapporteur mentioned:
“The
Special Rapporteur notes with concern that no response has been
provided to a
number of cases brought to the attention of the Government since 1998.
The
Special Rapporteur considers it appropriate to draw attention to the
views
expressed by the Committee against Torture after consideration of the
situation
in the country under the procedure provided for by Article 20 of the
Convention
against Torture, a summary of which may be found in report A/57/44,
paras
123-195”.
9. 6. The
practice of horrendous torture and the culture of impunity prevail only
in a
society where there is absolute failure of rule of law. Sri Lanka is an
example. The proposal will prove that the practice of torture in the
state has
further worsened and rule of law is beyond the scope of any recovery by
itself.
Concluding observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka : Sri Lanka CCPR/CO/79/LKA.
(Concluding
Observations/Comments) dated 01/12/2003.
Concluding observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka : Sri Lanka : CCPR/C/79/Add.56;
A/50/40,paras.436-476. (Concluding
Observations/Comments) dated 27-07-1995
Concluding Observations of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women : Sri
Lanka :
A/57/38 (Part1), paras. 256-302 dated 07/05/2002.
Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato’ Param
Cumaraswamy,
submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution
2001/39
(E/CN.4/2002/72) dated 11 February 2002.
Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human
Rights resolution 1992/32 (E/CN.4/1994/31) dated 6 January 1994.
Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human
Rights resolution E/CN.4/1999/61 dated 12 January 1999.
Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human
Rights resolution E/CN.4/2001/66 dated 25 January 2001.
Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on
Human
Rights resolution E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.1
dated 27 February 2003.
Posted on 2004-07-27
remarks:3 |